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PRIVACY REGULATION OF COMPUTER-
ASSISTED TESTING AND INSTRUCTION
Charles R. Tremper*
& Mark A. Small**
I. INTRODUCTION
o Seated in a second grade classroom, Jason begins to read the story
shown on his microcomputer screen. As he reads, he occasionally
points to words on the screen, thereby requesting the computer to pro-
nounce them. Jason selects some of the words because they are unfa-
miliar; others he chooses because he is entertained by the sound of the
computer's voice. Whatever the reason for Jason's choice, the com-
puter compiles a record of each word he selects. This record is stored
initially in a temporary file the computer uses to customize the lesson
it will present to Jason. At the end of the day, the classroom computer
uses this information to update Jason's permanent record in the
school's central computer.
* Brenda arrives for an interview at a large employment agency.
As she is seated, a man informs her that the interview will be con-
ducted by computer. He further explains that sensors connecting her
to the computer will monitor her physiological reactions as she
answers the questions. The interview begins with the computer
presenting a series of questions about previous work experience, which
Brenda easily answers using a keyboard. The computer then poses a
series of questions that are less directly related to employment qualifi-
cations, including one asking about employee drug testing. Brenda,
whose brother died of an overdose, interprets the question as inquiring
into her attitude toward experimenting with drugs. Becoming anx-
ious, she answers that she objects "very strongly" to employee drug
testing. At the end of the session, the computer analyzes all data gath-
ered during the interview and constructs a personality profile. Among
other things, the profile characterizes Brenda as a probable drug user.
As the above examples illustrate, using computers to assist in testing
and instruction creates privacy concerns that were absent or less con-
sequential prior to the computer age. Not only does computer-assisted
* Assistant Professor of Law and-Psychology, University of Nebraska; B.A. 1978, J.D. 1981,
Ph.D. Education Policy 1983, University of California, Los Angeles. The authors thank Don
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testing and instruction (CATI)' threaten to invade privacy insidi-
ously,2 its use with young schoolchildren poses the additional threat of
arresting development of their privacy expectations.' In light of the
significance of "reasonable expectations of privacy" in constitutional'
and tort' law, as well as privacy's role in resisting totalitarianism,6
widespread and routine use of CATI may profoundly alter the balance
between public and private realms.
1. Computer-assisted testing and instruction techniques are discussed in COMPUTERS IN
EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION (J. Hoot ed. 1986); N. EVANS, THE FUTURE OF THE
MICROCOMPUTER IN SCHOOLS (1986); G. KLEIMAN, BRAVE NEW SCHOOLS: How COMPUTERS
CAN CHANGE EDUCATION (1984); S. PAPERT, MINDSTORMS (1980); YOUNG CHILDREN AND
MICROCOMPUTERS (P. Campbell & G. Fein ed. 1986); and Tests Can't Solve Every Problem, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., May 19, 1984, at 84.
The prototypical CATI applications envisioned in this article use programming techniques
that vary the stimuli they provide based on responses from the person interacting with them.
Such sophisticated applications make use of artificial intelligence procedures and other
techniques that require more computer processing power than currently available in the schools.
See J. CHAMBERS & J. SPRECHER, COMPUTER-ASSISTED INSTRUCTION 114-18 (1983); S.
POGROW, EDUCATION IN THE COMPUTER AGE 26 (1983). Thus, the discussion here concerns
not the rudimentary computer-assisted methods in use today, but the forthcoming computer
applications that have been imagined by the authorities cited in this note.
2. See infra notes 30-78 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 33-39 and accompanying text. In a seminal study on the topic, Richard
Diem examined how 8 and 12-year-old students regarded the computerized work-products of
other students at a computer day camp. Diem, A Study of Children's Attitudes and Reactions to
the New Technology, 49 SoC. EDUC. 318 (1985). According to Diem, "[a]t no time during the
camp sessions did any student question his or her right to look at another's information. It was
as though all information were open and accessible to anyone who wished to view it." Id. at 319.
Although no general conclusions can be drawn from this single instance, the finding suggests a
need to assist young children in developing an appropriate regard for privacy. Pervasive CATI in
elementary school may undermine that process.
4. Since the Supreme Court's decision in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967),
reasonable expectations of privacy, to which subjective expectations contribute, have been critical
to defining the scope of the fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211-12 (1986) (aerial surreillance); Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 751 (1979) (pen registers) (Marshall, J., dissenting); United States v.
Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976) (bank records); Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment and the
"Legitimate Expectation of Privacy," 34 VAND. L. REV. 1289 (1981); Levin & Askin, Privacy in
the Courts: Law and Social Reality, J. Soc. ISSUES, Fall 1977, at 138, 140--42; Wilkins, Defining
the "Reasonable Expectation of Privacy". An Emerging Tripartite Analysis, 40 VAND. L. REV.
1077 (1987).
5. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984). For
examples of how reasonable expectations of privacy affect the outcome in intrusion cases, see
Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Servs., 435 So. 2d 705, 711 (Ala. 1983); Lewis v. Dayton
Hudson Corp., 128 Mich. App. 165, 339 N.W.2d 857 (1983); and Jeffers v. City of Seattle, 23
Wash. App. 301, 315-16, 597 P.2d 899, 907 (1979).
6. Numerous authors have commented that individual privacy impedes totalitarian rule. See
A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY: COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS, AND DOSSIERS 38-46
(1971); B. MOORE, PRIVACY: STUDIES IN SOCIAL AND CULTURAL HISTORY 74-75 (1984); J.
RULE, PRIVATE LIVES AND PUBLIC SURVEILLANCE 338-43 (1973); Bazelon, Probing Privacy,
12 GONZ. L. REV. 587, 592-93 (1977).
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Measured against the capacities of CATI technologies for invading
students' and test-takers' privacy, the governing law is becoming ever
less adequate. Current regulation consists of a fragmentary set of
principles and provisions that apply rather obliquely to CATI. 7 Virtu-
ally all of these rules were formulated without reference to CATI and
are not proving flexible enough to keep pace with advancing technol-
ogy. Even some of the rules created within this decade are predicated
upon visions of the future that largely failed to imagine the sociologi-
cal changes brought about by widespread microcomputer use.8
To act upon the recognition that "personal privacy can no longer
exist by yesterday's standards alone,"9 we must undertake a critical
analysis of the privacy issues inherent in CATI and update the regula-
tory structure accordingly. 10 To further these essential tasks, this arti-
cle examines the privacy implications of CATI,11 assesses the
adequacy of current law,1 2 and recommends strategies for achieving a
satisfactory balance between the benefits of CATI and the loss of pri-
vacy it may entail. 13
7. See infra notes 88-97 and accompanying text.
8. Observers commenting just eight to ten years ago did not envision the proliferation of
microcomputers in offices, schools, and homes. The number of individuals interacting with
computers greatly exceeds what the trend-line predicted absent the advent of the "personal"
computer. For relatively recent predictions that missed the significance of the microcomputer,
see Andersen & Rasmussen, Sociological Implications of Computer Systems, in HUMAN
INTERACTION WITH COMPUTERS 97 (H. Smith & T. Green ed. 1980); Noll, Regulation and
Computer Services, in THE COMPUTER AGE: A TWENTY-YEAR VIEW 254 (M. Dertouzos & J.
Moses ed. 1979); and Westin, The Long-Term Implications of Computers for Privacy and the
Protection of Public Order, in COMPUTERS AND PRIVACY IN THE NEXT DECADE 167 (L.
Hoffman ed. 1980).
9. Linowes, Must Personal Privacy Die in the Computer Age?, 65 A.B.A.J. 1180, 1184 (1979).
10. Because the technologies Jason and Brenda are pictured using in the introductory
vignettes have not yet become commonplace, action can be taken prospectively rather than
remedially as is often the case. In the 20 years or more since concerns began appearing in the
legal literature about high technology's potential for privacy invasion, an adequate legal response
has yet to develop. For the flavor of the early literature, see Michael, Speculations on the
Relation of the Computer to Individual Freedom and the Right to Pivacy, 33 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 270 (1964) (predicting that the dazzle of computerization might blind society to its
dangers); and Note, Anthropotelemetry: Dr. Schwitzgebel's Machine, 80 HARV. L. REV. 403
(1966) (warning that computer technology used t6 monitor humans' whereabouts would blur the
distinction between liberty and confinement).
11. See infra notes 30-78 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 79-140 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 141-177 and accompanying text.
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II. PRIVACY ISSUES IN CATI
Philosophers and social scientists have given considerable attention
to the importance of privacy for human well-being. i" Privacy has been
described as "an instrument for achieving individual goals of self-reali-
zation'' 5 and as necessary to "define the limits and boundaries of the
self."' 6 It has been credited further with enabling people to cope with
the pressures of everyday life, 7 permitting emotional release and self-
evaluation,' 8 and providing people with an essential sanctuary in
which to develop their identities. 9 Using similar language that the
Supreme Court has quoted, Charles Fried has characterized Jeffrey
Reiman's conception of privacy as embodying "the moral fact that a
person belongs to himself and not to others nor to society as a
whole."2°
In analyzing the multidimensional nature of the apparent human
need for privacy,2' many writers have identified control over personal
information and access to the self as the most important dimensions.22
Some have argued that loss of control over personal information
14. For a representative sample of recent commentary, in addition to the works cited infra
notes 15-19, see B. Moore, supra note 6; PRIVACY: A VANISHING VALUE? (W. Bier ed. 1980);
PRIVACY (J. Young ed. 1978); PRIVACY (J. Pennock & J. Chapman ed. 1971); C. SCHNEIDER,
SHAME, EXPOSURE AND PRIVACY (1977); D. SEIPP, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN AMERICAN
HISTORY (1981); P. WEISS, PRIVACY (1983); Privacy as a Behavioral Phenomenon, 33 J. Soc.
ISSUES 1 (1977); PRIVACY, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 251 (1966); The Law and Economics of
Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 621 (1980); Fischer, Privacy as a Profile ofAuthentic Consciousness, 11
HUMANITIES 27 (1975); McCloskey, Privacy and the Right to Privacy, 55 PHIL. 17 (1980);
Parent, Recent Work on the Concept of Privacy, 20 AM. PHIL. Q. 341 (1983); Rachels, ty
Privacy Is Important, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 323 (1975); Schwartz, The Social Psychology of
Privacy, 73 AM. J. Soc. 741 (1968).
15. A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 39 (1967).
16. I. ALTMAN, THE ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 50 (1975).
17. Jourard, Some Psychological Aspects of Privacy, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 307, 310
(1966).
18. Ingham, Privacy and Psychology, in PRIVACY 35, 45-46 (J. Young ed. 1978).
19. Laufer & Wolfe, Privacy as a Concept and a Social Issue: A Multidimensional
Developmental Theory, 33 J. Soc. ISSUES 22, 26-28 (1977).
20. American College of Obstetricians v. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. 747, 777 n.5 (1986) (Stevens,
J., concurring); Fried, Letter, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 288, 288 (1977).
21. Not everyone agrees that privacy is conceptualized best as a basic human need. See, e.g.,
Epstein, A Taste for Privacy? Evolution and the Emergence of a Naturalistic Ethic, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 665 (1980) (privacy is an individual taste without a biological basis); Posner, The Right of
Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 394 (1978) (privacy is an intermediate good). A compromise view
of sorts is that privacy is a socially created need, albeit one that appears to be universal. B.
MOORE, supra note 6, at 73-74, 274; Altman, Privacy Regulation: Culturally Universal or
Culturally Specific, J. Soc. ISSUES, Summer 1977, at 66.
22. A. MILLER, supra note 6, at 25; Beaney, The Right to Privacy and American Law, 31 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 253, 265 (1966); Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 493 (1968). Westin
defines privacy as "the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves
when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others." A.
Vol. 63:841, 1988
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imperils mental health because sense of self-worth largely depends
upon the perceptions of others.23 Other writers have noted that being
able to control access to the self is critical to feelings of well-being and
efficaciousness.
2 4
As useful as these various ruminations may be for understanding
the functions and importance of privacy, little of what has been writ-
ten is specifically applicable to CATI. Even forward-looking discus-
sions of privacy in the computer age generally have not dealt with the
range of privacy issues involved in CATI.z5  With few exceptions,
these analyses have pictured the computer as an enormous, efficiently-
indexed filing cabinet filled with electronic facsimiles of pre-existing
paper records.26
Although this filing cabinet model fits many computer applications
and has served as a good starting point for privacy regulation,27 in
several ways it is inadequate for CATI. First, the filing cabinet model
does not account for user interaction. Under the filing cabinet model,
the computer receives all its data from records made independently of
the computerized process. In CATI, a test-taker or learner sitting at a
computer terminal generates his or her own computer records during
testing and instruction. By bypassing the third party input stage that
is a hallmark of the filing cabinet model, CATI creates new opportuni-
ties for privacy invasion.
Second, the very nature of testing and instruction compounds the
privacy invasiveness of interactive computer use. The main purpose of
most testing is to find out about a test-taker's capabilities, potentially
WESTIN, supra note 15, at 7. This definition captures the information control aspect particularly
well.
23. 1. BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 156 (1969) ("the only persons who can so
recognize me, and thereby give me the sense of being someone, are the members of society to
which historically, morally, economically, and perhaps ethnically, I feel that I belong"); E.
GOFFMAN, RELATIONS IN PUBLIC (1971); Gross, Privacy and Autonomy, in PRIVACY 169,
172-73 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman ed. 1971); Huff, Thinking Clearly About Privacy, 55 WASH. L.
REv. 777, 779-81 (1980).
24. Jourard, supra note 17, at 310; Shils, Privacy: Its Constitution and Vicissitudes, 31 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 281, 286 (1966).
25. See, eg., Freedman, The Right of Privacy in the Age of Computer Data and Processing, 13
TEx. TECH L. REv. 1361 (1982) (focusing exclusively on mainframe computer records); Soma &
Wehmhoefer, A Legal and Technical Assessment of the Effect of Computers on Privacy, 60 DEN.
L.J. 449, 452-54 (1983) (CATI is not listed among the seven major areas of computer technology
predicted to affect privacy).
26. See generally Noll, supra note 8, at 265 (critiquing filing cabinet model by showing that
proposals to regulate computer services industry to protect privacy interests have been rendered
obsolete by data sharing among services).
27. See generally S. MANDELL, COMPUTERS, DATA PROCESSING, AND THE LAW 172 (1984)
(using the filing cabinet paradigm).
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revealing information the test-taker would prefer not to divulge.28 In
the elementary and secondary school classroom, the educational mis-
sion includes shaping students' values, manners and self-concepts, as
well as teaching them facts and skills.29 Finally, in both testing and
instruction, computer techniques exponentially increase the quantity
of information that teachers and psychometricians can collect and
analyze.
For analysis in this article, the various privacy threats CATI poses
are organized into three categories: Computerized information gather-
ing, management of the information collected, and misperceptions
resulting from interpretation of that information. Each category is
discussed below in the same order as it occurs in the CATI process.
A. Computerized Information Gathering During Testing
and Instruction
An initial privacy invasion may occur any time personal informa-
tion is collected. Depending on the technique used and the informa-
tion sought, information gathering practices differ in invasiveness.
From simple questioning to surreptitious observation and involuntary
extraction of information by physical or psychological means, the
degree of invasiveness rises and the ability of individuals to withhold
information and thereby protect their privacy diminishes.
As the introductory vignettes suggest, computers can be used in sev-
eral ways during testing and instruction to penetrate an individual's
normal defenses against revealing personal information.3" In so doing,
CATI imperils what Oscar Ruebhausen and Orville Brim identify as
the very essence of individual privacy: "[T]he freedom of the individ-
ual to pick and choose for himself the time and circumstances under
which, and most importantly, the extent to which, his attitudes,
beliefs, behavior and opinions are to be shared with or withheld from
28. For discussions of the need in indirect psychological testing to deceive test-takers about
the design and perhaps the purpose of the test, see Anastasi, Psychological Testing and Privacy, in
PRIVACY: A VANISHING VALUE? 348, 350-51 (W. Bier ed. 1980); and Wolf, Invasion of Privacy,
in CRUCIAL ISSUES IN TESTING 159, 163 (R. Tyler & R. Wolf ed. 1974).
29. The "whole child" approach in American education has led teachers and counselors to
involve themselves in students' socioemotional and moral as well as cognitive development. See
generally S. SARASON, THE CULTURE OF THE SCHOOL AND THE PROBLEM OF CHANGE 203-06
(1971); P. SCHARF, MORAL EDUCATION 109-36 (1978).
30. Certain uses of computers in testing and education constitute what Westin terms
"psychological surveillance," which he defines as "scientific and technological methods that seek
to extract information from an individual which he does not want to reveal or does not know he
is revealing or is led to reveal without a mature awareness of its significance for his privacy." A.
WESTIN, supra note 15, at 133.
846
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others."' 31  The prospect of circumventing normal psychological
defenses to probe into an individual's "core self" is the most damaging
variety of privacy invasion.32
As the process of testing and instruction progresses from marking
on paper to tapping on a keyboard, individuals, particularly school-
children, may lose much of their ability to conceal information about
themselves from observation and collection by others.33 In the paper
and pencil era, students could write a few choice epithets about the
school without revealing their contempt to anyone. They could also
make innumerable mistakes without fear of reproach. Their counter-
parts composing at keyboards, whose every keystroke may be
observed, recorded, and reviewed, will not have the same freedom.
34
More intrusive privacy invasions occur when computers are com-
bined with other devices to monitor a test-taker's or learner's previ-
ously undetectable biological processes. Microelectronic biomedical
devices developed for monitoring such special populations as prison-
ers, astronauts, and psychiatric patients can be adapted for testing and
instruction of the general population.3" Sophisticated sensors will be
able to monitor not only a person's visible activities, but also internal
biochemical changes or other unobservable phenomena.36 At present,
31. Ruebhausen & Brim, Privacy and Behavioral Research, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1184, 1189
(1965).
32. See A. WESTIN, supra note 15, at 42; Benn, Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons, in
PRIVACY 1, 7-9 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman ed. 1971).
33. Children may begin using computers even before they can read and write. See Hughes &
Macleod, Using Logo with Very Young Children, in COGNITION AND COMPUTERS 179 (1986).
Whether young children doodle with a light pen or use some other input device to respond to
images presented on the computer screen, the computer can record and analyze their
interactions.
34. Although students' myriad keystrokes would exceed a teacher's ability to review
exhaustively, the computer will perform much of the necessary analysis. Not only can the
computer be programmed to detect errors, it can also be instructed to alert the teacher if students
have entered profane or sexually oriented words, including slang and misspellings! With such
assistance teachers will be able to focus their attention more pointedly on the portion of student
work that interests them.
35. See generally Meindl, Biomedical Implantable Microelectronics, 210 Scl. 263 (1980)
(noting that innovative applications of microchips in implantable biomedical sensors will
improve health care); Weingarten, Privacy: A Terminal Idea, HUM. RTS., Fall 1982, at 18, 21
(discussing privacy implications of subcutaneous monitoring and transmitting devices).
36. For example, a sophisticated intelligence test might measure the delay between
presentation of a computer-generated stimulus and a test-taker's response and use that
measurement as an indicator of information processing speed. For an account of an experiment
using such an approach, see Small, Raney & Knapp, Complex Reaction Time and General
Intelligence: A Refinement, 148 J. GENETIC PSYCHOLOGY 405 (1987). Regarding the
relationship between speed of information processing and intelligence, see Jensen, Chronometric
Analysis ofIntelligence, 3 J. Soc. & BIOLOGICAL STRUCTURE 103 (1980).
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we can only guess at how successful these techniques will be for gener-
ating inferences about the psychological make-up of the subject.37
The incessant computerized collection and storage of such data
could make CATI much more privacy invasive than conventional test-
ing and instruction. Privacy has long survived in part because we have
lacked the ability to intrude as deeply into each other's affairs as we
might38 if we had the necessary means. In the traditional classroom, a
teacher who wonders whether young Jessica is performing poorly
because she is emotionally distressed may observe only how Jessica
appears and acts. If she wishes, Jessica can use a variety of techniques
to mask her true feelings and prevent the teacher from discovering
what she does not wish to reveal. If a computer is constantly monitor-
ing Jessica's physiology, the teacher can use the resulting data to cir-
cumvent Jessica's conventional privacy screens.
Although the advent of such capabilities may be regarded as merely
an extension of what teachers and testers have always done, the new
technology radically transforms the nature of observation by making it
impersonal, invariable, and much more difficult, if not impossible, for
the monitored person to influence voluntarily.39
B. Inappropriate Management of Personal Information
Once information has been recorded during CATI, the privacy
threat shifts from data collection to data management. Release of pre-
viously collected personal information further erodes individuals'
power to shape their public image. Loss of control over personal
information, even if it is not subsequently released to others, reinforces
the impression that individuals are powerless to set themselves apart
from society.
The predominant concern expressed in the literature and recognized
at law regarding release of computerized records has been disclosure
to individuals with no legitimate interest in the information.' In the
CATI context, this concern is joined by two others that rarely arise in
other contexts. One is privacy invasive disclosure to the record-sub-
ject. An instructional or testing computer may confront people with
37. The vignette with Brenda in the introduction to this article illustrates one potential pitfall.
38. See A. WESTIN, supra note 15, at 19-22.
39. See Anastaplo, The Public Interest in Privacy: On Becoming and Being Human, 26 DE
PAUL L. REV. 767, 785 (1977).
40. A. MILLER, supra note 6, at 26; Trubow, Information Law Overview, 18 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 815, 819-20 (1985).
Vol. 63:841, 1988
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information about themselves that would cause distress.41 The other
is that the extremely sensitive nature of some information a computer
may obtain during direct interaction with a record-subject may be
inappropriate for release to teachers, employers, and parents, who tra-
ditionally have been considered to have a legitimate interest in and
right of access to the information.42  Record-subjects may lose a
greater measure of privacy if matters they wish most to hide are
revealed to a single person than if some piece of information already
known by another person is exposed to a wider audience.
A related problem is the use of a record for a purpose different from
the one for which it was created.43 As with release to unknown par-
ties, inappropriate use decreases record-subjects' ability to shape their
public image. Computers increase the likelihood of inappropriate use
by isolating information from the context in which it was gathered.'
41. Although such revelations may occur in the course of human interactions, the CATI
analog differs in two respects. These can be seen clearly in the context of psychotherapy. First,
the revelation by a computer need not be mediated by the discretion of a human being familiar
with the full dynamics of the situation, i.e., the computer may inform the subject of the revelation
indiscriminately. In the absence of a human interface, the mystique of the computer may incline
subjects to rely unduly on the assessment. The observations of a fellow, fallible, human may be
more easily dismissed.
Second, a psychotherapist's conclusions about a client's unrecognized psychological attributes
need not be embodied in a "record." Consequently, information privacy laws granting a legally
enforceable right to discover "records" would not apply. On the other hand, such laws typically
apply to all entries on a computer's storage medium, and would permit clients to discover the'
computer-generated inferences about their character. See, eg., Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a (1982 & Supp. 1986). The mental processes of the psychotherapist, including memories of
what the client has said and any inference the psychologist makes, simply are not records in the
sense that data in a computer are.
42. Parties permitted access under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974
("FERPA") are discussed in Cudlipp, The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act Two Years
Later, 11 U. RICH. L. REV. 33 (1976); and Schatken, Student Records at Institutions of
Postsecondary Education: Selected Issues Under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of
1974, 4 J. C. & U.L. 147, 169-74 (1977).
Because most schoolchildren are minors, school counselors face difficult ethical and practical
issues in deciding whether to inform parents or school administrators about information gained
during counseling sessions. See Clarizio, School Psychologists and the Mental Health Needs of
Students, in SCHOOL PSYCHOLOGY: PERSPECTIVES AND ISSUES 309 (G. Phye & D. Reschly ed.
1979); Wagner, Confidentiality and the School Counselor, 59 PERSONNEL & GUIDANCE J. 305
(1981).
43. See U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: ELECTRONIC RECORD SYSTEMS AND INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY
37-38 (1986); Corell, Technological Development and Its Consequences for Data Protection,
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Proceedings of the 14th Colloquy on European Law 42, 49 (1985);
Shattuck, In the Shadow of 1984: National Identification Systems, Computer-Matching, and
Privacy in the United States, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 991 (1984).
44. P. SIEGHART, PRIVACY AND COMPUTERS 68 (1976); Wheeler, Problems and Issues in
Record-Keeping, in ON RECORD: FILES AND DOSSIERS IN AMERICAN LIFE 3 (S. Wheeler ed.
1969).
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Computerized relational databases permit an educator to search
records more efficiently and to use special search strategies that may
identify students who would not have been noticed if conventional
methods had been used. For example, school records containing
socioeconomic data supplied for civil rights compliance might be com-
bined with various test scores and patterns of daily computer use in an
attempt to estimate the likelihood that youngsters will become juvenile
delinquents.45 Although such efforts have been undertaken without
CATI, the availability of computerized records greatly reduces the
requisite effort and thereby makes it more likely that the analysis will
be conducted.46
Computers also exacerbate the problem of information release
because human judgment need not be exercised to effect release. In the
past, a teacher had to make a conscious decision about forwarding an
assessment of any sort to the schoool records office (a decision that
will be influenced by a host of variables other than the simple determi-
nation of whether the assessment is correct).47 The direct-monitoring
computer, however, may automatically transmit its records to a cen-
tral registry. 48 The farther records travel from their original source
and the greater the number of copies in existence, the less ability the
record-subject has to supervise use of the information or even to know
who has access to it.
In addition, parties with no legitimate interest may gain acess to
CATI data. While this problem is hardly novel, the nature of CATI
45. Using existing education, health, and justice system records, Norway already has
attempted to do this. Bing, Data Protection and Social Policy, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Proceedings
of the 14th Colloquy on European Law 82, 91 (1985).
46. The legal implications of computers' increased capacity per se are murky. Justice
Brennan, who may be the member of the current Supreme Court most concerned with privacy
issues, has written, "collection and storage of data by the State that is in itself legitimate is not
rendered unconstitutional simply because new technology makes the State's operations more
efficient." Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 606-07 (1977) (concurring opinion).
47. See generally Groves, Professional Discretion and Personal Liability of Teachers in
Relation to Grades and Records, 101 EDUC. 335 (1981) (explaining factors influencing decisions
to forward grades and reports).
In some instances, e.g., processing of standardized intelligence tests, the action of the teacher
and computer would be nearly identical in forwarding the results to an "outside" source. The
difference with the computer lies in the potential to drastically increase the volume of routine
transmission of information.
48. See N. EVANS, supra note 1, at 142-44. At some point in the process, humans must have
instructed the computer in the general rules it uses in transferring information. A computer's
implementation of these a priori decision rules is quite different from humans applying the same
rules, however, because of the possibility that a human will not follow the rule in a particular
case. The well-recognized difficulty of formulating rules of general application with sufficient
sensitivity to account for diverse circumstances ensures that the computer will treat as alike cases
which a human would distinguish.
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adds new dimensions. As with other computerized information, the
possibility of remote access is much greater than it is for paper
records. 49
The linking together of computers by dedicated wiring, telephone
lines, microwaves, or other networking technology creates the possibil-
ity of someone gaining access to information without being present at
the record's physical location. The greater danger in CATI, however,
may be posed by on-site system users. Particularly in the classroom
setting, databanks will be highly vulnerable to invasion by curious
interlopers5 0 The apparent ease with which computer "hackers,"
including children, have gainef access to "secure" systems51 and the
numerous instances of personal materials being released inappropri-
ately 2 suggest the need for caution.
With the potential for obtaining and storing voluminous informa-
tion about individuals, CATI also raises the specter that record-sub-
jects will be known disturbingly well by parties with authorized access
49. See Levine, Privacy in the Tradition of the Western World, in PRIVACY: A VANISHING
VALUE? 3, 16-17 (W. Bier ed. 1980); Salerno, Catching Up with the Computer Revolution, HARV.
Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1981, 'at 8, 16.
50. Students who have access to the system for input may also have a gateway to each other's
records. Perhaps this threat to privacy is no greater than the prospect that students will gain
access to paper records in their teacher's desk or the principal's office, but the contingency must
at least be anticipated.
The findings of Diem's seminal examination of young students' computer use provides support
for the assumption that abuse of some sort will occur. Diem found that "[t]he students also
learned rather quickly how to abuse the informational systems at hand. A group of older boys,
for example, managed to identify one of their colleague's data access codes, and used it to write a
derogatory program that appeared when the young man returned to his machine." Diem, supra
note 3, at 319.
51. Browne, Locking Out the Hackers, DISCOVER, Nov. 1983, at 30, 31; Korzeniowski, All-
Star Teen Hacker's Team Beats Hundreds of Systems; COMPUTERWORLD, July 8, 1985, at 14;
Shattuck, supra note 45, at 993-94.
52. Churchill & Baratz, The Illusion of Privacy: Student Records in Los Angeles, Soc. POL'Y,
Mar.-Apr. 1978, at 38; Divoky, Cumulative Records: Assault on Privacy, LEARNING, Sept. 1973,
at 18. Some of these instances have led to litigation. For example, in York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450
(9th Cir. 1963), cert denied, 376 U.S. 939 (1964), plaintiff was awarded damages based on the
actions of police officers gaining consent to take pictures of her in the nude ostensibly for use as
evidence and then distributing the pictures among their friends. In Fadjo v. Coon, 633 F.2d 1172
(5th Cir. 1981), individuals who had provided the Florida Attorney General's Office with
personal information upon a promise of confidentiality were entitled to damages when that
information was disclosed without their consent.
Although the instances cited here do not concern computers, they confirm that no matter how
potentially embarrassing or damaging an item may be, once it has passed beyond control of the
subject, the possibility of release to others cannot be dismissed.
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to the computer.53 Individuals lose privacy if others know more about
them than they would like them to have know, regardless of how well-
intentioned the privacy invaders may be.
Because their records may be released to unknown parties or com-
piled to their disadvantage, people may choose to "base their decisions
and fashion their behavior in terms of enhancing their record image in
the eyes of those who may have access to it in the future."' 54 At the
time Arthur Miller described this insidious effect on behavior as "the
real evil of a records prison,",55 the record-keeping process he envi-
sioned was limited to documenting a person's public, observable, per-
formance and status. The potential impact on behavior becomes still
more troubling when a computer is recording myriad keyboard inter-
actions during daily classroom activities or monitoring physiolgoical
processes that are not normally under the control of conscious
choice.-
6
C. Inaccurate Human Images Based on Computerized Testing and
Instruction Records
Thus far, the potential threats CATI poses to privacy have con-
cerned the loss of a person's control over how information is gathered
and managed. To a great extent, the harm associated with this loss of
control stems from the prospect that the resulting record will give an
inaccurate impression, either because the information is false or
because it is taken out of context. 57 Becoming the subject of a com-
puter record that indicates a below average reading speed during a
53. See A. NEIER, DOSSIER: THE SECRET FILES They KEEP ON You 18-20 (1975); Barron,
People, Not Computers, in PRIVACY 319, 320 (J. Young ed. 1978); Solomon, Personal Privacy and
the "1984" Syndrome, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 753, 759 (1985).
Based on far less information than can be obtained in CATI, advertisers already are
constructing rudimentary psychographic profiles of consumers that combine such standard
demographic variables as age, sex and income, with measures designed to represent potential
customers' "dreams, hopes, fears, and beliefs." Townsend, Psychographic Glitter and Gold, AM.
DEMOGRAPHICS, Nov. 1985, at 22, 23. The advertisers then use these profiles in targeting
appeals to specific segments of the buying public. See Johnson, Computer Technology Is Key to
Segmentation and Service, DIRECT MARKETING, June 1985, at 66, 68.
54. A. MILLER, supra note 6, at 50. Hubert Humphrey tapped the same vein with his
observation that "[w]e act differently if we believe we are being observed. If we can never be sure
whether or not we are being watched and listened to, all our actions will be altered and our very
character will change." HUMPHREY, Foreword to E. LONG, THE INTRUDERS: THE INVASION OF
PRIVACY BY GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY viii (1967).
55. A. MILLER, supra note 6, at 50.
56. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
57. Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 707, 718 (1987)
("A second, no less important, consequence of automated processing is the loss of context.");
Wheeler, supra note 44.
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verbal skills test may cause distress; becoming the subject of a such a
record incorrectly undoutedly magnifies the harm. Not only does it
enable some other person to form an impression based on a character-
istic that generally is not observable, hence private in at least one
sense, it also makes it likely that the impression will be faulty.
Although records invariably are incomplete and reflect some obser-
vational bias,5" the problems of omission and -error are particularly
acute for computers in general and CATI in particular. Personnel
who review these computerized records are unlikely to recognize inac-
curacies because they typically have neither personal acquaintance
with the record-subject nor any other independent basis upon which to
form an impression. The power of computers to abstract and manipu-
late data exacerbates the problem of inaccuracy by encouraging
abstraction and quantification. Although narrative information is
likely to give a more complete description of an individual, computers
use quantitative and categorical data almost exclusively.
In addition to being wrong or incomplete, a person's record image
may be distored if it contains outdated information. Arthur Miller has
aptly noted that "a computerized file has a certain indelible quality-
adversities cannot be overcome by the passage of time in the absence
of an electronic eraser and a compassionate soul willing to use it."59
The opportunity for a new beginning offered by institutional "system-
atic forgetting' ' 0 is a strong theme in American individualism and
well respected at law.61 As their storage capacities increase, com-
puters become ever more capapble of retaining old assessments that
58. PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMM'N, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION
SOCIETY 3-6 (1977); see also U.S. CONGRESS, supra note 43, at 5 (noting that the accuracy of
most Privacy Act record systems is unknown and the quality of the known systems varies
widely); cf Andersen & Rasmussen, supra note 8, at 108 (noting the computer's potential to
bring more information to bear on bureaucratic decision-making).
59. A. MILLER, supra note 6, at 38. The same may be said of paper records. The critical
difference is the far superior capacity of the computer to maintain huge numbers of records and
provide access to them far into the future. Moreover, with large capacity computers, deleting
information is more bothersome and expensive than retaining it. Sardinas, Blank & Spiro, Data
Processing: Towards a Social Responsibility, J. SYs. MGMT., May 1986, at 14, 16. For paper
records, the need for the physical space that files occupy provides an incentive for periodically
discarding outdated material.
60. Rule, McAdam, Stearns & Uglow, Preserving Individual Autonomy in an Information-
Oriented Society, in COMPUTERS AND PRIVACY IN THE NEXT DECADE 65, 75 (L. Hoffman ed.
1980).
61. One of the chief rationales for a separate juvenile justice system with closed proceedings is
to give young offenders a chance to reform without being followed through life by a record of
their youthful transgressions. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550 (1970) (avoiding
public trials cited as rationale for denying jury trials to juvenile defendants); Larson, Model
Statute on Juvenile and Family Court RecordA Juv. & FAM. CT. J., Feb.-Mar. 1981, at 8, 12-13;
Lister, Privacy, Recordkeeping, and Juvenile Justice, in PURSUING JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD 205,
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may label an individual at a very early age and make change difficult.6 2
Even if additional information is input, it will not necessarily be cross-
referenced to previous entries.
As CATI technology improves, systems will increasingly use artifi-
cial intelligence 63 and expert systems techniques to detect some types
of inaccuracy automaticallly. Far from solving accuracy problems,
however, the advent of such systems will introduce extra sources of
potential distortion, especially in their early years.
One problem is likely to be misplaced reliance on the conclusions
resulting from expert systems analysis. An expert system is designed
to replicate the analysis of a human expert by applying an inference
algorithm to information it has been provided.' If the algorithm is
faulty, erroneous records may be generated from accurate input.
Although anyone who receives a printout from an expert system
should be wary of possible error, the "black box" nature of the system
may incline users to accept results derived from accurate input, the
only element of the system they can verify.
206 (M. Rosenheim ed. 1976); Sagatun & Edwards, The Significance of Juvenile Records, Juv. &
FAM. CT. J., Feb. 1979, at 29, 34.
In some circumstances, adults too have been considered entitled to live their lives without
being dogged by reminders of past misdeeds. See Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 93-94 (1931)
(damages for privacy invasion awarded based on invasion of privacy resulting from movie about
a former prostitute who had married and was living a respectable life) (superceded by statute).
Franklin & Johnsen, Expunging Criminal Records: Concealment and Dishonesty in an Open
Society, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 733 (1981); Volenick, Juvenile Court and Arrest Records, 9
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 169, 172-73 (1975).
62. For discussions of the difficulty individuals face in overcoming preconceptions others
form based on "labels" for their personal characteristics, see J. BROPHY & T. GOOD, TEACHER-
STUDENT RELATIONSHIPS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 30-32 (1974); E. SCHUR, LABELING
DEVIANT BEHAVIOR 38-52 (1971). Although the validity of labeling, or the "self-fulfilling
prophesy," as originally understood has been cast into doubt, computerized records that provide
the basis for educational placement or other treatment certainly may have a profound effect on
the ease with which an individual may overcome an erroneous characterization. Wineburg, The
Self-Fulfillment of the Self-Fulfilling Prophesy, 16 EDUC. RESEARCHER 28 (1987). See generally
Barron, People, Not Computers, in PRIVACY 319 (J. Young ed. 1978); Coffee, Privacy Versus
Parens Patriae: The Role of Police Records in the Sentencing and Surveillance of Juveniles, 57
CORNELL L. REV. 571, 591-94 (1972); Goslin & Bordier, Record-Keeping in Elementary and
Secondary Schools, in ON RECORD: FILES AND DOSSIERS IN AMERICAN LIFE 29, 50-56 (S.
Wheeler ed. 1969).
63. Artificial intelligence is the term for programming techniques that enable computers to
imitate some aspect of human intelligence, especially deriving conclusions from propositions. See
P. WINSTON, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (1979). Regarding the use of artifical intelligence in
computer assisted instruction, see J. CHAMBERS & J. SPRECHER, supra note 1, at 108-18.
64. See generally Myers, Introduction to Expert Systems, IEEE EXPERT, Spring 1986, at 100;
Nau, Expert Computer Systems, COMPUTER, Feb. 1983, at 63.
65. This problem may be reduced, although not eliminated, by having the computer provide
an explanation of its reasoning processes. See E. RICH, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 201-42
(1983); D. WATERMAN, A GUIDE TO EXPERT SYSTEMS 90-91 (1986).
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Given identical information, an error-free expert system likely will
perform better than the average practitioner.66 Therefore, reliance on
the computer's assessment might appear sensible. Rarely, however,
are human experts limited to the information available to the com-
puter. In any testing or instruction setting, a human may be aware of
circumstances that could affect interpretation of the data available to
the computer.6 7 Furthermore, an expert system may foster distortion
by enabling untrained individuals to make decisions based on the
apparently straightforward printouts without consulting a
psychometrician or other appropriate specialist.6"
Misguided use of advanced programmming techniques poses an
additional threat to privacy that is virtually unique to classroom
CATI. Computerized elementary school instruction that adjusts the
instructional mode and perhaps even the content to match what the
computer infers to be appropriate for the learner has ominous implica-
tions for shaping children's images of who they are. For example, a
girl's frequent errors on verbally-based lessons may lead the computer
to begin offering more visually-oriented materials and commend her
for responding appropriately to pictures.6 9 In the process, the girl's
self-image may change from budding-novelist to artist: The negative
implications of this scenario become apparent upon considering the
uniformity that computers can bring to public education. Whereas the
semi-autonomy of classroom teachers has heretofore precluded appre-
ciable standardization, mass-produced instructional software packages
that interact directly with students could achieve a high degree of uni-
66. See Myers, supra note 64.
67. For this reason, the authors of an article describing an emergency room expert system
that diagnoses heart attacks more accurately than doctors were able to do, counseled against
relying on the computer's diagnosis without following standard examination procedures as well.
Goldman, Cook, Brand, Lee, Rouan, Weisberg, Acampora, Stasiulewicz, Walshon, Terranova,
Gottlieb, Kobernick, Goldstein-Wayne, Copen, Daley, Brandt, Jones, Mellors & Jakubowski, A
Computer Protocol to Predict Myocardial Infarction in Emergency Department Patients with Chest
Pain, 318 NEw ENG. J. MED. 797 (1988).
68. The same problem has been observed regarding the output from medical expert systems.
Gill, Medical Expert Systems Grappling with Issues of Liability, I HIGH TECH. L.J. 483, 493
(1986).
69. Decisions about learning strategies "can all be made contingent upon a model or analysis
of the learner's strengths and weaknesses in the domain being taught. Individual students,
differing in their styles of learning or their rates of progress can be presented with different
materials tailored to their personal skills and proclivities." Lepper & Milojkovic, The "Computer
Revolution" in Education: A Research Perspective, in YOUNG CHILDREN AND MICRO-
COMPUTERS 11, 14 (P. Campbell & G. Fein ed. 1986).
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formity.7 ° This prospect imperils the individualism essential to mean-
ingful privacy.71
These new threats to privacy, as well as the benefits that artificial
intelligence-based systems will bring to the education process, will
materialize slowly over the coming years as the necessary technology
evolves. The complexity of most educational settings ensures that sys-
tems approaching human capabilities will not be available any time
soon and that when systems do become available, they will perform
only limited tasks of dubious validity until the experimental phase has
passed. After adequate procedures do become available, the higher
relative cost of state-of-the-art systems will prevent many institutions
from abandoning their less expensive systems.72
Ultimately, the potential benefits of gathering as much information
as possible from students in order to make the most of their instruc-
tion must be balanced against the impact on society of subjecting chil-
dren to omnipresent surveillance by "teaching machines." Although
we cannot know for certain how this process will affect children,
research suggests that most young children lack the capacity to recog-
nize and resist these privacy invasive practices and that the concepts of
privacy children develop are strongly influenced by their exper-
iences.73 If children are subject to involuntary computer monitoring
throughout their school days, their expectations of privacy in the
future may be substantially reduced.
70. Cf Steffin, Fighting Against Convergent Thinking: Using the Micro as a Weapon, 59
CHILDHOOD EDUC. 255 (1983) (arguing that the microcomputer promotes divergent thinking as
well as allows for more privacy).
71. This discussion is not intended to dismiss the potential utility of computer-assisted
instruction to produce numerous instructional benefits. Whereas those beneficial possibilities
have been extolled elsewhere, the objective here is to draw attention to the less well recognized
pitfalls of the enterprise so that the process can be implemented in a way that strikes an
appropriate balance between the potential benefits and risks. See sources cited supra note 1. See
generally Rule, McAdam, Steams & Uglow, supra note 60, at 70 (discussing the difficulty of
resisting computer technology's allure).
72. In Peninsula Counseling Center v. Rahm, 105 Wash. 2d 929, 719 P.2d 926 (1986), a
majority of the Washington Supreme Court upheld the Washington Department of Social and
Health Services' use of a computerized system that was somewhat more efficient but also more
privacy invasive than a proposed alternative. Id. at 935-36, 719 P.2d at 929. Only Justices
Pearson and Brachtenbach found the cost justification insufficient. Id. at 937-49, 719 P.2d at
930-36 (Pearson, J., dissenting).
73. Melton, Minors and Privacy: Are Legal and Psychological Concepts Compatible? 62 NEB.
L. REV. 455, 486-92 (1983); Wolfe & Laufer, The Concept of Privacy in Childhood and
Adolescence, 6 MAN-ENV'T INTERACTIONS 29 (1974).
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The dangers here are especially great because most youths under
age sixteen are subject to compulsory education74 and adults rarely
acknowledge the legitimacy of children's privacy needs.75 As recently
as 1984, Justice Rehnquist, writing for a majority of the Supreme
Court, echoed the traditional view of children as always being in
"some form of custody."' 76 The efficiency of school administration, on
the other hand, appears to be highly valued on the Court77 and in
society.78 Unless specific legislation prohibits the objectionable prac-
tice, the judiciary may regard CATI's efficiency as a sufficient benefit
to offset the threat it poses to privacy.
III. CURRENT PRIVACY REGULATION OF CATI
Existing laws and legal principles pertaining to CATI create a
patchwork of restrictions reflecting no consistent approach to protect-
ing privacy. Thus, appraising the current status of CATI privacy reg-
ulation requires canvassing k wide range of legal sources. To lay the
groundwork for the necessary analysis, this Part begins with an over-
view of the major sources of applicable constitutional, common, and
statutory law. The remainder of the Part presents an analysis of how
these rules bear on CATI information collection, management, and
accuracy.
74. K. ALEXANDER & F. JORDAN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF EDUCATIONAL CHOICE:
COMPULSORY ATTENDANCE AND STUDENT ASSIGNMENT 14-17 (1973).
75. See H. COHEN, EQUAL RIGHTS FOR CHILDREN 135 (1980); Melton, supra note 73, at 488
(privacy inconsistent with society's conception of children); Rosenberg, Schall v. Martin:A Child
is a Child is a Child, 12 AM. J. CRIM. L. 253 (1984) (Supreme Court gives children's privacy
interests little weight in fourth amendment analysis).
76. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984). Twenty years earlier, the Court concluded
that the Constitution protects minors' liberty against arbitrary deprivation by the state. In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). Commentary on the Supreme Court's changing conceptualization of
children's rights is provided in Rush, The Warren and Burger Courts on State, Parent, and Child
Conflict Resolution: A Comparative Analysis and Proposed Methodology, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 461
(1985).
77. In rejecting one student's privacy claim under the fourth amendment, the Court noted
that school administrators need greater latitude to conduct searches without a warrant or
probable cause to believe students have committed a criminal offense. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. 325, 339-43 (1985); see also Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988)
(rejecting student's first amendment challenge in part because permitting the speech would have
placed an extra burden on school personnel).
78. See Lewis, Misinterpretations of Educational Issues Abound as Election Year Gets Under
Way, 65 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 443, 443 (1984).
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A. Overview of Potentially Applicable Law
1. Constitutional Law
As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the United States Constitu-
tion affords little if any protection against the types of privacy inva-
sions CATI can entail.7 9 Although the Court has interpreted the
Constitution as protecting some types of privacy, the objectionable
governmental actions in those cases are quite unlike anything CATI
involves.8° The Court's recently expressed unwillingness to extend
privacy protection beyond these previously recognized contexts sug-
gests the Constitution may not serve as a material constraint in this
area.8" Nonetheless, the Court has expressed the view that the Consti-
tution limits egregious government information and record-keeping
practices.82 Thus, some CATI privacy invasions, particularly those
79. Regarding the evolving constitutional right of privacy, see Hufstedler, The Directions and
Misdirections of a Constitutional Right of Privacy, 26 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 546 (1971); Posner,
The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 Sup. Cr. REV. 173; and
Richards, Constitutional Legitimacy and Constitutional Privacy, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 800 (1986).
80. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (marriage); Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494 (1977) (right to determine family unit); Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (contraception). These cases rest upon
a general constitutional privacy right, the source of which is much debated. See Epstein,
Substantive Due Process by Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 Sup. CT. REV. 159;
Garvey, Freedom and Choice in Constitutional Law, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1756 (1981); Kauper,
Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental and Things Forgotten: The Griswold
Case, 64 MICH. L. REV. 235 (1965).
Specific constitutional provisions that protect privacy, such as the fourth amendment
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, are too tangential to CATI to warrant
discussion here except as they pertain to the legal significance of privacy expectations.
81. The Court's apparent reluctance to expand the scope of constitutional privacy appears in
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). In concluding that criminal prosecution for
consensual adult homosexual activity does not invade a zone of privacy protected by the
Constitution, the Court emphasized that none of its previous holdings recognized an entitlement
to engage in homosexual conduct. This strong attachment to precedent contrasts sharply with
the reasoning from constitutional values that marked earlier privacy cases. Regarding the
contrast between Bowers v. Hardwick and previous privacy cases, see Comment, Thus Far and
No Further: The Supreme Court Draws the Outer Boundaries of the Right of Privacy, 61 TUL. L.
REV. 907 (1987) (reviewing cases which increasingly expanded boundaries of right to privacy).
Nor does the Court seem willing to address privacy issues under other amendments. See Note,
Bowers v. Hardwick- An Incomplete Constitutional Analysis, 65 N.C.L. REV. 1100 (1987).
82. Although the Court has yet to vindicate an information privacy claim, it has treated such
claims as legitimate. In Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), the Court upheld the
constitutionality of a New York state requirement that doctors report the identities of patients
receiving certain prescription drugs to a central computerized registry. While finding the
safeguards built into the New York system sufficient to warrant upholding the law, the majority
opinion explicitly acknowledges that "the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters" is constitutionally protected. Id. at 599. In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan
offered an explanation of constitutional privacy protection that might have more bearing on
CATI. In Brennan's view, "the Constitution puts limits not only on the type of information the
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involving public school students' private thoughts or psycho-biological
functioning, may be constitutionally impermissible.8 3
Unlike the federal version, some state constituions do have explicit
privacy provisions." In Califdrmia, for example, the legislature has
proclaimed that under the state constitution "all individuals have a
right of privacy in information pertaining to them."' 5 How much pro-
tection such provisions offer is uncertain, as most state constitution
privacy clauses were adopted after 1970 and have yet to be construed
authoritatively.
2. Common Law
With greater flexibility than constitutional law, common law pro-
vides a potentially powerful source of privacy protection. As with
constitutional law, however, currently recognized common law causes
of action do not clearly apply to CATI privacy invasions. In almost all
states, privacy tort law has not moved beyond the four discrete vari-
eties of privacy invasion Dean Prosser delineated almost thirty years
State may gather, but also on the means it may use to gather it." Id. at 607; see also Nixon v.
Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 465 (1977); Seng, The Constitution and Informational
Privacy, or How So-Called Conservatives Countenance Governmental Intrusion into a Person's
Private Affairs, 18 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 871, 893 (1985) (arguing that federal judges need to
make explicit their reasons for denying informational rights to privacy); Note, The Constitutional
Right to Confidentiality, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 133 (1982) (differentiating autonomy right
from right of confidentiality); Note, The ConstitutionalRight to Withhold Private Information, 77
Nw. U.L. REv. 536, 547-57 (1982) (arguing that the Court in Whalen established a right to
informational privacy which has been misapplied by lower courts); Note, The Interest in Limiting
the Disclosure of Personal Information: A Constitutional Analysis, 36 VAND. L. REv. 139, 143
(1983) (arguing that an individual "who suffers injury should have standing to contend that the
government had no legitimate interest in disclosing his personal information in violation of that
original confidence, or that the disclosure did not bear a rational relationship to achievement of a
valid governmental objective").
83. In addition to variations of substantive due process arguments that have been offered
previously, a first amendment argument may exist for limiting some forms of CATI monitoring
that intrude substantially on public school students' opportunities for mental repose. Among the
functions of the first amendment, Thomas Emerson has identified restricting the government
from interfering unduly with the opportunities an individual may have to "think his own
thoughts, have his own secrets, live his own life, [and] reveal only what he wants to the outside
world." T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 545 (1970). CATI could be
implemented in ways that would impinge upon such opportunities and perhaps give rise to a first
amendment claim.
The outcome of any claim against allegedly unconstitutional practices in the schools is far
from certain, however. See supra text accompanying notes 76-78.
84. See, eg., ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22; ARIz. CONST. art. 2, § 8; WASH. CONsT. art. I, § 7;
see also Peck, Extending the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the New Technological Age, 12
HoFsTRA L. REv. 893, 897 n.25 (1984); Development in the Law, The Interpretation of State
Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1324, 1430-31 (1982).
85. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.1 (West 1985) (referring to CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1).
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ago.8 6 Unless courts transcend the strictures of Prosser's discrete cate-
gories and recognize a more general theory of privacy torts,87 the com-
mon law will afford little protection against the types of privacy
invasions discussed in this article as peculiar to the CATI context.
3. Statutory Law
Some federal and state statutory provisions afford explicit, albeit
limited protection against privacy invasion. The most comprehensive
of the federal statutes is the Privacy Act of 1974 ("Privacy Act).8"
Several provisions of this seminal legislation pertain to information in
government computers. The Freedom of Information Act, 9 by
excluding from disclosure requests for personnel, medical, and similar
files that would constitute an invasion of privacy, also bears on the
privacy of many federal records. Both acts relate only tangentially to
CATI, however. More directly relevant are the Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 ("FERPA")9 ° and the Education of
the Handicapped Act ("EHA").91 Both of these statutes impose
detailed record-keeping regulations on all educational institutions
receiving federal funds. FERPA has been credited with virtually elim-
inating the abuses toward which it was directed;92 EHA extends the
scope of FERPA to additional populations and refines some of its pro-
visions. One other federal law applies to some school-based CATI.
86. Note, Privacy, Computers, and the Commercial Dissemination of Personal Information, 65
TEX. L. REV. 1395, 1412-13 (1987). The four categories are appropriation of a person's name or
likeness, intrusion upon solitude or seclusion, portraying an individual in a false light, and public
disclosure of private facts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 28A (1977). Prosser first
advanced his typology in Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
87. Several commentators have advocated such an approach. See Bloustein, Privacy as an
Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962 (1964); Gavison,
Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 423 (1980); Note, supra note 86.
An Ohio case attests to the difficulty of persuading a court to recognize a claim that does not
fit neatly within one of Prosser's categories. Plaintiffs sought a ruling that selling magazine
subscription lists to mass mail merchandisers is tortiously privacy invasive. The court declined
the invitation to go beyond settled law, asserting, "[ilt is not within our province to create a
specific right which is not recognized at common law." Shibley v. Time, Inc., 45 Ohio App. 2d
69, 341 N.E.2d 337, 340 (1975).
88. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). For a review of how the Privacy Act has been
interpreted, see Ehlke, The Privacy Act After a Decade, 18 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 829, 830
(1985).
89. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1982).
90. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1982).
91. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1420 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
92. Rudensky, Buckley Amendment Found Effective in Protecting Student Privacy,
CHRONICLE HIGHER EDUC., May 5, 1982, at 15; Schatken, supra note 42, at 150-51.
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The Pupil Protection Act limits collection of certain types of informa-
tion by some federally funded experimental programs.93
A number of states have passed laws similar to, and in some cases
more extensive than, the federal legislation.94 For a time in the early
1970's, state legislatures were very active on the privacy front, but that
activity largely subsided following congressional approval of the Pri-
vacy Act and FERPA. Like the federal statutes, state laws almost
uniformly lack specific reference to CATI. A broad interpretation of
these laws may be possible in states such as California, though, where
the legislature has recognized that the "increasing use of computers
and other sophisticated information technology has greatly magnified
the potential risk to individual privacy that can occur from the main-
tenance of personal information."
95
One limitation of all federal and many state privacy laws is that they
apply only to governmental agencies or private enterprises affiliated
with the government. Agreements among private parties may fill the
gap to some extent. For example, a labor contract may limit employee
testing. In the absence of enforceable laws or other legally-binding
constraints on privacy invasion, however, CATI practitioners are sub-
ject only to the guidelines of professional organizations to vwhich they
may belong.96
Unfortunately, these various sources of privacy regulation do not
combine into an adequate system. Some privacy issues may be gov-
erned by several distinct sources of law. Other issues are not
addressed at all. Constitutional and common law may evolve to pro-
vide more comprehensive coverage, but currently offer no protection
against some of the privacy threats CATI poses.97 Statutes enacted
93. 20 U.S.C. § 1232h (1982). The law prohibits requiring students to participate in certain
forms of examination, testing, and treatment, the primary purpose of which is to rfveal
information about seven listed items including sex behavior and attitudes, income, and political
affiliations. Id. § 1232h(b); see Mesibov, Protection of Students' Privacy Rights: The Hatch
Amendment, SCH. L. BULL., Fall 1985, at 15.
94. See, eg., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 6250-6267 (West 1980 & Supp. 1988); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 895.50 (West 1983). For a discussion of the potential interplay between federal and state
statutes, see Comment, Access to Student Records in Wisconsin: A Comparative Analysis of the
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 and Wisconsin Statute Section 118.125, 1976
Wis. L. REv. 975. A similar analysis of California law may be found in Comment, Informational
Privacy and Public Records, 8 PAC. L.J. 25 (1977).
95. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.1(b) (West 1985).
96. E.g., AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF STATE PSYCHOLOGY BOARDS, GUIDELINES FOR
COMPUTER BASED ASSESSMENTS AND INTERPRETATION (Mar. 1985) (copy on file with
Washington Law Review); AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, GUIDELINES FOR
COMPUTER-BASED TESTS AND INTERPRETATIONS (Jan. 1986) (copy on file with Washington
Law Review).
97. In addition to the limitations discussed above, see infra text accompanying note 158.
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within the past fifteen years fill some of the gaps, but most were passed
without reference to CATI technologies and are not designed to deal
with privacy problems that arise when individuals interact directly
with computers as they may in CATI.
B Applicability to CATI of Existing Privacy Law
To expose the deficiencies of current law, the following analysis
examines the application of the various sources of law reviewed above
to the CATI privacy threats discussed in Part II. First, the analysis
discusses potential limitations on using computers to collect informa-
tion. Second, limitations on the use of information gathered are
assessed. Third, the analysis examines current safeguards against mis-
perceptions resulting from CATI.
1. Limitations on Using Computers to Collect Information During
Testing and Instruction
Aside from prohibiting most secret surveillance, laws place few con-
straints on either the types of information that can be gathered pursu-
ant to CATI or on the techniques that may be used to gather it. Of the
four privacy torts, only intrusion into private affairs98 has any rele-
vance. Courts have interpreted this proscription primarily as a safe-
guard against interfering with personal activities by observing such
activities without permission or by disrupting an individual's solitude
or seclusion.9 9 To transfer this protection against meddlesome intru-
sion to the quite different circumstances of CATI would require a
broadening of current doctrine. 'I Even if the doctrine were stretched,
consent by the record-subject would limit its utility. Almost all testing
and instruction participants voluntarily relinquish control over infor-
mation the computer collects. Consent, if given knowingly and intelli-
gently, insulates the information collection process from legal
challenge. 1o
98. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1976); Comment, The Emerging Tort of
Intrusion, 55 IOWA L. REV 718 (1969-70).
99. Galella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (constant surveillance of
celebrity by photographer redressed by injunction prohibiting photographer from approaching
within certain distances of celebrity, her home, and her family).
100. See Comment, Informational Privacy and Public Records, 8 PAC. L.J. 25 (1977). One
difficulty is that, under current doctrine, the defendant must know or should know that the
intrusion would be offensive to persons of ordinary sensibilities. See, e.g., Bitsie v. Walston, 85
N.M. 655, 515 P.2d 659, 661 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 85 N.M. 639, 515 P.2d 643 (N.M.
1973). The types of intrusion associated with CATI are not as clearly outrageous.
101. McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling, 60 Ga. App. 92, 2 S.E.2d 810 (1939)
(plaintiff's authorization to defendant company to investigate his personal injury claim
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A few statutes pertaining generally to information collection might
include CATI within their scope. A number of the major privacy laws
impose a requirement that government agencies collect only informa-
tion that is relevant to some legitimate, specified purpose. 10 2 Attempts
to gain certain types of information during CATI could run afoul of
such provisions. 103 That such laws appreciably limit CATI, though, is
doubtful. The purpose of many types of testing and instruction is so
broad that almost any information may be deemed relevant.
The prospect that individuals may be compelled to reveal highly
sensitive personal data during psychological testing or some similar
process has prompted at least a small legislative response. A 1974
congressional limitation on certain federally funded experimental edu-
cation programs forbids requiring students to submit to psychiatric or
psychological examination, testing, or treatment, the primary purpose
of which is to reveal psychological problems, sexuality, illegal -and
anti-social behavior, family relations, or other highly personal mat-
ters."°4 Reflecting a similar concern for privacy, a Nebraska law pro-
hibits asking questions during a polygraph or voice stress examination
regarding the examinee's sexual practices, labor union, political or
religious affiliations, or marital relationship, except when such ques-
tions bear on the issues under examination. 105 Such laws logically
might be extended to CATI, but do not apply clearly as written.
In the absence of specific legislation, the courts have taken tentative
steps toward limiting some forms of data collection. In one case, a
federal district court prohibited administration of a paper and pencil
survey designed to identify potential drug users among junior high
school students. 106 In holding that the survey violated the constitu-
tional right of privacy, the court found that the dangers associated
with compelling students to answer sensitive questions about personal
matters, such as their relationships with their parents, exceeded any
constituted consent to gather personal information about plaintiff); Note, Jar Wars" Drug Testing
in the Workplace, 23 WILLAMETrE L. REv. 529, 560-61 (1987) (consent, if voluntary, may
vitiate objection to drug testing).
102. Eg., Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(1) (1982); see Ehlke, supra note 88, at 830.
Although FERPA contains no similar limitation on collection of information for education
records, constraints may be found at the state level. The Illinois School Student Records Act, for
example, requires that every entry in a student's file be "of clear relevance to the education of the
student." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, para 50-4(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988).
103. During a stress or aptitude test, for example, questions might probe into attitudes that
are irrelevant to the purpose for which the test is being conducted.
104. General Education Provisions Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232h(b) (1982).
105. NEB. REv. STAT. § 81-1928(3) (1987).
106. Merriken v. Cressman, 364 F. Supp. 913, 921 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
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good the program might accomplish. 107 In an employment context,
another court reached the opposite conclusion. Applicants seeking to
become fire fighters in Jersey City, New Jersey unsuccessfully chal-
lenged mandatory psychological testing that probed into their private
affairs.'° 8 The court held that the interest of the city in screening out
applicants who would not be able to handle the psychological pres-
sures of the job was sufficient to justify the intrusion into the appli-
cants' privacy. 1°9 These cases suggest that judicial protection against
information gathering is equivocal and will depend on the context, the
potential harm to the individual, and the expected benefits for society.
In addition to these minor limits on the types of information com-
puters may collect, laws also place a few restrictions on the techniques
used in gathering information. Most of these limitations are of little
value in the typical testing or instruction setting, either because the
record-subject consents to the process or because CATI applications
do not fit within the definition of the prohibited method. For example,
similarities between some aspects of CATI and wiretapping might sug-
gest that limitations on wiretapping should apply." ° Wiretapping is
prohibited largely because it occurs without the target's awareness and
violates that person's reasonable expectations about the confidentiality
of the communication."' The same considerations may apply if com-
puters are used in testing and instruction to monitor subjects without
their knowledge or if such computers use algorithms to draw infer-
ences based on information the subject knowingly provides." 2
Despite this similarity, such situations are not within the ambit of
wiretapping statutes because the language of those laws is limited to
intercepting a communication being transmitted from sender to
receiver. "' The CATI process lacks this feature.
107. Id. at 918, 920-21.
108. McKenna v. Fargo, 451 F. Supp. 1355, 1381 (D.N.J. 1978), aff'd, 601 F.2d 575 (3d Cir.
1979).
109. Id. The court was not entirely sympathetic to the requirement, however, noting,
"[t]here is good reason to scrutinize a government requirement which joins the words psychology
and testing. Psychology is not yet the science that medicine is and tests are too frequently used
like talismanic formulas." Id. at 1357.
110. For examples of wiretap legislation, see Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848, 1851 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 632 (West 1970 & Supp. 1988); and MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.807(3) (Callaghan
1982).
111. Ashdown, supra note 4, at 1311-12.
112. Such a possibility may be quite strong where the computer is used in routine instruction.
113. See, e.g., Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (Supp.
IV 1986); CAL. PENAL CODE § 632 (West 1970 & Supp. 1988).
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One other source of law pertaining to an activity similar in some
respects to CATI is the restriction some states place on the use of
polygraphs.' 14 The second vignette described in the introduction to
this article envisions a computer functioning as a lie-detector. Statutes
and court decisions restricting polygraph use could be invoked when a
computer substitutes for a human examiner. To the extent these
restrictions are motivated by aversion to the physical intrusiveness of
wiring a human to a polygraph machine, though, veracity assessment
techniques relying on computer keyboard input alone may be
unaffected. 115
2. Limitations on the Use of Information Gathered During CATI
When legislatures first reacted to the existence of massive computer
dossiers potentially available to any curious party, they enacted stat-
utes to limit access to government data files. 116 The Privacy Act of
1974,117 the Federal Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1976
("FERPA"),118  and the Education of the Handicapped Act
("EHA") 119 all restrict record access. Each of these laws prohibits
release of specified records without the record-subject's consent, unless
the disclosure fits within one of the explicitly permitted exceptions.
For FERPA, those exceptions permit access by school personnel with
legitimate educational interests, agents of accrediting agencies, and
individuals satisfying any of seven other criteria.12 All of these laws
reflect an international public consensus that access to computer files
should be limited.121
114. For reviews of the legal limitations on polygraph testing, see Herron, Statutory
Restrictions on Polygraph Testing in Employer-Employee Relationships, 37 LAB. L.J. 632 (1986);
Nagle, The Polygraph in the Workplace, 18 U. RICH. L. REv. 43, 64-76 (1983); and Toomey,
Compelled Lie Detector Tests and Public Employees: What Happened to the Fifth Amendment?,
21 S. TEX. L.J. 375 (1981).
115. Experimenters are continuing to explore methods of assessing truthfulness without
attaching sensors to the body. See Kubis, Some Problems of Privacy and Surveillance in a
Technological Age, in PRIVACY 193, 217 (W. Bier ed. 1980). The computer could be a key
component of such a system.
116. Trubow, Fighting Off the New Technology, HUM. RTs., Fall 1982, at 26, 51.
117. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
118. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1982).
119. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412-1420 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
120. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1) (1982).
121. U.S. CONGRESS, supra note 43, at 27-29 (reviewing opinion polls showing substantial
concern about improper use of computerized information); Gassman & Pipe, Synthesis Report, in
10 POLICY ISSUES IN DATA PROTECTION AND PRIVACY: CONCEPTS AND PERSPECTIVES 12,
12-13 (Proceeding of the OECD seminar, June 24-26, 1974) (reporting consensus of European
representatives that access should be limited); PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMM'N, supra
note 58, at 19-21 (offering guidelines to protect the perceived public interest in limited access).
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Despite substantial efforts to mandate that information in computer
files be secure, these measures have not yet addressed the special secur-
ity concerns attributable to the special nature of CATI. The highly
personal nature of some testing and instruction makes access to some
CATI records potentially more privacy invasive than access to other
types of records. Although some statutes do specify higher levels of
security for particularly sensitive information,122 the chief federal laws
bearing most directly on CATI do not make such a distinction. Thus,
for example, under FERPA, the exceptions that permit access without
the record-subject's consent do not differentiate between a chemistry
grade and a computer-generated personality profile.'23 The capabilities
of CATI to create highly sensitive personal records could make the
access provisions more privacy invasive than Congress had
intended. 124
The one common law rule that may apply to disclosures of accurate
information is the prohibition in many states against public disclosure
of private facts. 125 The current utility of this doctrine for the typical
CATI situation is quite limited, however, because courts typically
have denied recovery unless the disclosure was to a sufficiently large
public. 126 Passing the information along to a supervisor or transmit-
ting it from one computer to another, without more, probably would
not satisfy this "public disclosure" requirement.
122. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3371 (McKinney 1985) (prohibiting disclosure of
knowledge of particular patients or research subjects, as well as reports or records of them);
WASH. REV. CODE § 71.24.035(5)(h) (1987) (listing statutory references for preventing
disclosure by mental health authorities).
123. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)(A) (1982).
124. The same danger does not exist for most other forms of highly sensitive information
about students that school personnel may have recorded because written observations of a
teacher or school psychologist are likely to fit within the "private records" exclusion from
FERPA's definition of education records. Id. § 1232g(a)(4)(B)(i). Records a computer generates
from student input do not qualify for the "desk notes" exclusion because they are not made by
school personnel for the purpose of reminding themselves of the matter noted. For a discussion
of FERPA's "private records" provision, see Schatken, supra note 42, at 159-61.
125. See, e.g., McSurely v. McClellan, 753 F.2d 88, 112-13 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1005 (1985). This case provides an example of how a court emphasizes flexibility in the
application of the theory behind the tort of disclosure to specific instances of conduct. The court
held actionable the conduct of a Senate subcommittee investigator who forced a husband to read
through, page by page, documents detailing intimacies of his wife's premarital relationships. The
husband, who had been unaware of these activities, was thus forced to discover them. The court
held actionable a cause under a theory of invasion of each spouse's seclusion. See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
126. See, e.g., Harrison v. Humble Oil & Ref., 264 F. Supp. 89, 92 (D.S.C. 1967); Timperley
v. Chase Collection Serv., 272 Cal. App. 2d 697, 77 Cal. Rptr. 782, 783-84 (1969); French v.
Safeway Stores, 247 Or. 554, 430 P.2d 1021, 1022-23 (1967); see also PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS 856-59 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984).
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In recognition that records may be highly sensitive and that their
release to inappropriate parties could be damaging to the record-sub-
ject, courts and legislatures have substantially restricted the discretion
of information managers. The day has long since passed when record
custodians could credibly assert an ownership interest in the contents
of the files they possessed.'27 The law now recognizes that individual
record-subjects retain a measure of control over at least some informa-
tion about them that has passed into an organization's data banks.
One may doubt the adequacy of these limitations, however, in view of
the capacity of instructional and testing computers to collect so much
information, on so many people, that has such potential for being
abused.
3. Safeguards Against Misperceptions Resulting from CATI Results
Along with preserving confidentiality, insuring accuracy of com-
puter records has been a major thrust of regulation. The principal
means of accomplishing this objective has been to give record-subjects
the rights to review their files and to challenge misleading material.128
Statutes incorporating this feature give public education students and
some other individuals a potentially effective means of policing the
accuracy of CATI files maintained by government institutions. Simi-
lar provisions for the private sector are rare.
Purging information no longer needed for any legitimate purpose is
also an essential element of computer privacy regulation. Nonetheless,
the major privacy laws have not required systematic removal of out-
dated data.'29 The more recent Education of the Handicapped Act
("EHA") requires schools to notify parents of handicapped students
when records are no longer needed and to destroy those records if the
parents so request. 130 Inclusion of this provision may signal increasing
legislative concern about the distortions that may result from retention
of old records.
A number of states have adopted provisions similar to the EHA
limitation, and some have imposed specific time periods after which
records must be destroyed.131 A Massachusetts law reflects particular
sensitivity in this regard. In all Massachusetts public schools, "[t]he
127. Cudlipp, supra note 42, at 33-34.
128. See, eg., Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); Federal
Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1982).
129. Neither the Privacy Act of 1974 nor FERPA restricts retention.
130. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(2)(D), 1417(c) (1982).
131. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, para. 50-4(f) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988) (temporary
records must be destroyed within five years of student's last attendance).
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score of any group intelligence test administered to a student enrolled
in a public school shall be removed from the record of said student at
the end of the school year in which such test was so administered."' 132
With regard to the accuracy of records the computer itself has gen-
erated, no laws specifically apply. Nonetheless, common law and con-
stitutional principles may afford a basis for a legal claim if someone
suffers harm because of a negligently developed or administered CATI
system. 133 The possibility of such litigation may motivate CATI oper-
ators to proceed responsibly.
Cases challenging alleged inappropriate use of conventional psycho-
logical testing might have provided useful guidance in establishing
limits on the use of information generated in the course of CATI. The
difficulty is that the precedents regarding use of psychological tests are
in disarray. Two major cases pertaining to use of intelligence tests in
educational placement reveal the depth of disagreement. A district
court in California ruled that a standardized test could not be used for
placing black children in educable mentally retarded classes because
the test was culturally biased and therefore misclassified the stu-
dents. 134 After reviewing much of the same evidence, an Illinois court
held that, when used with other criteria, standardized test results are a
permissible basis for special education assignments. 135
The opposite outcomes of these cases demonstrate not only the legal
vulnerability of testing in general, but also the range of judicial opin-
ion on the matter. By analogy to conventional testing, the ability of
CATI to withstand judicial scrutiny will depend in part on the suffi-
ciency of empirical research confirming the validity of computer-gen-
erated inferences. In contrast to conventional testing cases, however,
the outcome for a CATI challenge also may depend on a judge's opin-
ion of the propriety of computers, rather than humans, making the
critical inferences.
An important ancillary issue underlying all attempts to safeguard
against misperception is the ability of a record-subject to determine
132. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 71, § 87 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
133. Common law tort actions for defamation or portraying a person in a false light may be
available. See generally Nycum & Lowell, Common Law and Statutory Liability for Inaccurate
Computer-Based Data, 30 EMORY L.J. 445, 452-62 (1981) (exploring potential liabilities for
those charged with maintaining accuracy in asset accounts). Application of these doctrines to
CATI records raises no special issues and is not explored at length here.
134. Larry P. v. Riles, 495 F. Supp. 926, 988-89 (N.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
793 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1984).
135. Parents in Action on Special Educ. (PASE) v. Hannon, 506 F. Supp. 831, 882-83 (N.D.
Il1. 1980). For a more thorough comparison of Larry P. and PASE, see Bersoff, Testing and the
Law, 36 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1047 (1981).
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how the computer transformed the raw data it collected. Although no
legislation addresses this issue directly, FERPA might be interpreted
to provide a right of access to a copy of the code comprising the actual
computer program. This right might be inferred from the FERPA
requirement that educational institutions provide students with an
explanation or interpretation of any education record.136 Trade
secrecy, copyright, and other competing considerations, however, may
dissuade courts from interpreting the right so broadly.
Furthermore, very little law regulates attribution of the source of
computer records, whether accurate or not. An Illinois statute requir-
ing that every entry to a student's cumulative file bear the name and
signature of the person responsible for adding the information pro-
vides an example of what might be done to ensure that a record can be
traced back to its source.' 37 Although the Illinois legislature did not
contemplate computerized record systems when passing that law, the
principle it embodies may be even more important as computer tech-
nology makes it harder to determine how a record originated.
138
Because the harm from inaccuracy is so readily comprehended, leg-
islators and courts have long recognized the propriety of relief. None-
theless, existing sources of protection against CATI errors are not
adequate. Current regulation does not recognize the -capacity of
sophisticated computer programs to err in new ways. The danger of
erroneous records will increase as testing and instruction computers
not only record information that users consciously enter, but also
draw and record their own inferences from those entries. The poten-
tial harm increases as computers tailor interactions dynamically
depending upon users' responses. 139 Even if such procedures function
flawlessly, they may threaten privacy. The patterns of interaction
between young children and a seemingly omniscient computer may
seriously distort their developing expectations of privacy and sense of
self.14
0
136. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(2) (1982); see Bersoff, supra note 135, at 1053-55.
137. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, para. 50-4(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988).
138. Fortunately, a computer program can be designed to include procedures tliat make the
origins of many records discernible.
139. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
140. See infra note 165 and accompanying text.
869
Washington Law Review
IV. TOWARD ADEQUATE PRIVACY LIMITATIONS
ON CATI
A. Transcending the Existing Privacy Protection Framework
The principal problem with seeking adequate privacy limits for
CATI within current law is that the existing legal framework for pri-
vacy protection does not comprehend the most serious threats CATI
poses. Since 1977, the de facto standards for privacy protection in the
United States have been the three cardinal recommendations of the
Privacy Protection Study Commission:
[T]o create a proper balance between what an individual is expected to
divulge to a record-keeping organization and what he seeks in return (to
minimize intrusiveness);
[T]o open up record-keeping operations in ways that will minimize the
extent to which recorded information about an individual is itself a
source of unfairness in any decision about him made on the basis of it (to
maximize fairness);
and
[T]o create and define obligations with respect to the uses and disclo-
sures that will be made of recorded information about an individual (to
create legitimate, enforceable expectations of confidentiality).14 1
The consensus that has developed around these principles 42 sug-
gests they may reflect a nationally acceptable balance between privacy
and efficiency with respect to the matters they address. Thus they
must serve as at least a starting point for CATI privacy regulation.
141. See PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMM'N, supra note 58, at 14-15. In passing the
Privacy Act of 1974, Congress created the Privacy Protection Study Commission to conduct
a 'study of the data banks, automatic data processing programs, and information systems of
governmental, regional, and private organizations, in order to determine the standards and
procedures in force for the protection of personal information' [and] to recommend to the
President and the Congress the extent, if any, to which the principles and requirements of
the Privacy Act of 1974 should be applied to organizations other than agencies of the
Federal Executive branch and to make such other legislative recommendations as the
Commission deems necessary to protect the privacy of individuals while meeting the
legitimate needs of government and society for information.
Id. at xv.
142. See also U.S. DEP'T HEW, SEC'Y'S ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL
DATA SYSTEMS, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS (1973), which
recommends the following principles of "fair information practice":
There must be a way for an individual to find out what information about him is in the
record and how it is used.
There must be a way for an individual to prevent information about him obtained for one
purpose from being used or made available for other purposes without his consent.
There must be a way for an individual to correct or amend a record of identifiable
information about him.
Id. at 41.
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With regard to the second and third points, straightforward applica-
tion of the Commission's information management principles may
provide an adequate basis for specifying acceptable limits on the use of
information collected in the CATI process. Whether point one is ade-
quate to respond to the remaining CATI privacy threats depends on
the meaning given to "intrusion into personal affairs."' 43 To date, this
phrase has been understood to refer almost exclusively to processes
that probe into especially sensitive areas, involve surreptitious data-
gathering, or invade an individual's seclusion."4 But lawmakers must
also recognize that depriving people of control over the collection of
information about them is inimical to privacy even if the method
employed does not intrude into "personal affairs" per se.145 The more
pervasive, mysterious, impersonal, and imperceptible the process, the
more objectionable it is according to this alternative view.
The most serious challenge to the Privacy Protection Study Com-
mission's paradigm comes from the use of computers to gather infor-
mation incident to routine activities. In such instance, the monitoring
or information gathering occurs not as the principal objective of the
activity, but as a byproduct of an activity undertaken for an independ-
ent purpose. A distinguishing feature of this process is that the indi-
vidual engaging in it has no interest in a record being created, and very
often the organization that creates the record needs it only
momentarily. 146
143. While legislatures have passed numerous privacy laws directed toward effectuating the
second and third points, few measures are designed to limit data gathering in the first instance.
See Rule, McAdam, Stearns & Uglow, supra note 60, at 74-76.
144. 1 PRIVACY LAW AND PRAMnCE 1.06 (G. Trubow ed. 1987).
145. Consensus may exist regarding this proposition, despite its lack of manifestation in the
major privacy laws. One group of authors has conjectured that "[e]ven when the ends of
surveillance are impeccable and even when the agencies concerned carry out their monitoring
with full rectitude and discretion, the monitoring of every moment would strike most people as
unacceptable." Rule, McAdam, Steams & Uglow, supra note 60, at 74; see also Fried, supra note
22, at 475. While this may be true, we. are less certain that "virtually everyone" will insist on
limiting monitoring at the expense of efficiency or other clear benefits, especially if the subjects
are children. See Miller, Do Americans Really Value Privacy?, in THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 40
(G. McClellan ed. 1976) (concluding that the public will pay very little for privacy).
146. Placing local telephone calls is the quintessential example. A caller gains nothing by
having the telephone number recorded. The telephone company needs the number only to place
the call. Having obtained the number for that purpose, the telephone company typically makes
no record of it, although it could.
The reasonableness of a person's expectation that a telephone company will not retain a
telephone number after it has been used to place a call divided the Supreme Court in Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). The majority concluded that because the caller must reveal the
number to the telephone company in order to place the call, an expectation of privacy is not
reasonable. Id. at 742. Justice Stewart's dissent analogized the number dialed to the caller's
spoken message, which also must be provided to the telephone company for communication to
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The generation of a record incident to some activity certainly is not
unique to CATI nor even a phenomenon solely of the computer era.
By writing checks and placing telephone calls, individuals produce
incidental records that may be used for purposes the originator never
intended. 1 47 What computers add is a quantum increase in the perva-
siveness of incidental information recording and the possibility of its
extension into more personal domains. As has been recognized with
regard to interactive cable television 148 and microprocessor-equipped
transaction cards,149 the privacy implications of new technologies that
have the capacity to record information about people's daily affairs are
not generally appreciated when the technologies are adopted.
In CATI, a classroom computer may monitor a student's keystrokes
so it can respond with appropriate instructional displays. In the work-
place, a secretary's word processor records keystrokes to create a busi-
ness letter. Incidentally, both computers can produce a record of
errors, interaction time, and other items that may later be analyzed in
combination with other information. As these incidental monitoring
techniques become part of the daily routines of education and work,
the potential for developing detailed character profiles will rise
sharply.
Trying to frame objections to any of these privacy invasive processes
within the existing legal framework is almost impossible. Although
erroneous data processing that results in a defamatory characteriza-
tion of a person and release of test results to inappropriate parties fits
the traditional legal model, use of a test like the one described in the
opening vignette about Brenda is not easily challenged through litiga-
tion. Aside from the possibility of error that the vignette highlights,
Brenda's objection to taking the test may have little to do with this
particular instance of intrusion into matters she regards as private, but
with the pattern of which it is a part. Perhaps the employer also
occur. Id. at 747-48 (Stewart, J., dissenting). With digitized communication, the majority's
distinction based on whether the "contents" of the communication are acquired is extremely
insubstantial.
147. In addition to Smith, see United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (checks, deposit
slips, and other bank related documents considered business records of the bank, not private
papers; therefore, respondent had no legitimate expectation of privacy upon which he could
argue that such records should be protected from disclosure by subpoena) (superceded by
statute); and Ashdown, supra note 4.
148. Meyerson, The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984: A Balancing Act on the
Coaxial Wires, 19 GA. L. REV. 543, 612-18 (1985); Note, As Interactive Cable Enters, Does
Privacy Go Out the Window?, 4 COMM/ENT L.J. 781 (1982); Comment, Interactive Cable
Television: Privacy Legislation, 19 GONz. L. REV. 709 (1983-84).
149. Peck, supra note 84, at 896; Weingarten, supra note 35, at 20.
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makes use of drug testing, 15 0 criminal record checks,' genetic screen-
ing,'52 video surveillance, 53 polygraph tests,5 4 background checks, 55
and computerized productivity monitoring.'56 In combination, these
measures may reduce individual privacy below an acceptable thresh-
old.'57 The panoply of privacy invasions in Brenda's off-the-job envi-
ronment may also contribute to the perceived offensiveness of the
employment screening test. From Brenda's perspective, this one test
may push the cumulative assault on her privacy over the limit. Iso-
lated as a single legal claim, however, Brenda's complaint is but an
individualized dissatisfaction a court has no power to remedy. 58
Brenda's next challenge would be to formulate a legal theory that
would provide an exception to employers' traditional discretion to hire
150. See generally Rothstein, Drug Testing in the Workplace: The Challenge to Employment
Relations and Employment Law, 63 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 683, 743 (1987) (arguing that "a facile
solution to the problem of workplace drug abuse will not be found in a specimen jar or a million
specimen jars"); Comment, Unrestricted Private Employee Drug Testing Programs: An Invasion of
the Worker's Right to Privacy, 23 CAL. W.L. REv. 72 (1986).
151. For an example of a law prohibiting most employers from requesting arrest information,
see CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.7 (West Supp. 1988).
152. For an overview of the current debate on genetic testing in the workplace, see Peirce,
The Regulation of Genetic Testing in the Workplace-A Legislative Proposal, 46 OHIO ST. L.J.
771 (1985).
153. See I. SHEPARD & R. DUSTON, WORKPLACE PRIVACY: EMPLOYEE TESTING,
SURVEILLANCE, WRONGFUL DISCHARGE, AND OTHER AREAS OF VULNERABILITY 63-64
(1987) (discussing invasive nature of video surveillance).
154. See Nagle, supra note 114 (invasive quality of polygraph tests).
155. See I. SHEPARD & R. DuSTON, supra note 153, at 47-48 (invasive quality of background
checks).
156. See 9 TO 5, NAT'L ASS'N OF WORKING WOMEN, Computer Monitoring and Other
Dirty Tricks 3-4 (April 1986) (copy on file with Washington Law Review); Sherizen, Work
Monitoring: Productivity Gains at What Cost to Privacy?, COMPUTERWORLD, July 7, 1986, at 55.
157. Aside from dissatisfaction with the requirements of a particular employer, the job
applicant may be seeking to construct some barrier against the panoply of privacy invasions in
her environment.
158. For tactical purposes, a litigant may need to isolate a single element of a complex system
as being particularly objectionable-the screening test in Brenda's case. The trade-off of focusing
on a single element, however, is likely to be that the potential harm appears insignificant in
isolation and that the litigation will not provide an opportunity to present the totality of the
potential harm.
Challenging an entire system or pattern of operation in court, while possible, is unwieldy. The
litigation campaigns to improve conditions in prisons and mental health facilities demonstrate
that courts can deal with systemic wrongs and fashion sufficiently detailed remedies to redress
identifiable harms. See, ag, Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd in part,
rem'd in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). In light of the
difficulties encountered in Wyatt however, it may be the exception that proves the rule that
courts are not well suited for such functions. For an account of the problems that dogged the
decade-long litigation effort to improve conditions at the Wilnowbrook mental institution in New
York, see D. ROTHMAN & S. ROTHMAN, THE WILLOWBROOK WARS (1984).
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upon whatever nondiscriminatory grounds they choose. 159 Brenda
would also need to overcome the judiciary's natural reluctance to
grant claims based on allegations of contingent or remote harm.' 6°
The inadequacy of current law for protecting privacy interests
against invasive CATI practices leaves the developers and users of
these techniques with de facto authority to balance the benefits of each
CATI practice against the damage individuals and society may suffer
from loss of privacy. Ideally, this discretion will be used to adopt stan-
dards that respect privacy. Prospects for adequate self-regulation,
however, are slim.16' The diversity of CATI users in education and
employment makes it unlikely that professional organizations will pro-
vide the requisite leadership and uniformity. Even if a mechanism
develops for promulgating and enforcing industry-wide standards,
lack of consensus about what those standards should be will impede
action. Given the industry's self-interest in the matter and the
profound societal ramifications of the outcome, government interven-
tion offers the only feasible method of insuring adequate privacy
protection.
B. A Statutory Response
1. General Features of an Adequate Law
If the law is to respond, the statutory route offers the best method of
regulating CATI. Not only can statutes be written with sufficient
precision and revised as necessary in light of future developments, they
can afford practitioners a clear source of guidance. Leaving the matter
to further constitutional or common law development risks sacrificing
important societal interests that individual litigants are poorly suited
to raise.' 62 Relying on the limited class of individuals who would have
standing to sue could result in poor policy for everyone. Most
159. See M. ROTHSTEIN, A. KNAPP, & L. LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW 191-92 (1987); see
also Hermann, Privacy, the Prospective Employee, and Employment Testing: The Need to Restrict
Polygraph and Personality Testing, 47 WASH. L. REv. 73 (1971) (reviewing the panoply of laws
and legal theories pertaining to employment screening and concluding that there are few
constraints on employers' discretion to require applicants to take tests).
160. See, e.g., Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972) (dismissal of a claim against the Army based
on its conducting surveillance of lawful peace movement activities upheld because plaintiffs failed
to show actual or imminent harm). The paucity of empirical research on the effects of privacy
deprivation may incline courts to adopt a wait and see attitude.
161. Self-regulation has long been recommended. See, e.g., Grenier, Computers and Privacy:
A Proposal for Self-Regulation, 1970 DUKE L.J. 495 (suggesting self-regulation with oversight by
the federal government).
162. See Simitis, supra note 57, at 709. In the employment context, the decision to sue may
come at the cost of a workplace confrontation between one or more employees and an employer.
For CATI used in the schools, a court challenge will occur only if interested adults decide to sue
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importantly, enacting suitable legislation seizes the opportunity to act
prospectively before privacy invasive CATI procedures become
widespread. 163
To derive the benefits CATI offers and still protect privacy, safe-.
guards as novel as the dangers must be devised."6 For example, in
classroom settings, students might be empowered to opt out of com-
puterized monitoring whenever they press a button. This mechanism
would provide tomorrow's students with a shield from observation
similar to what we enjoyed when writing in a notebook we did not
intend to give to the teacher.
Based on the meager research findings on children's development of
privacy expectations, putting the burden on the student to withdraw
from monitoring may be an unrealistic approach for young children
who have not internalized privacy values.1 65 To assist primary school
students in developing a sense of privacy, structuring their computer
interactions to include periods that are clearly exempted from teacher
monitoring would be more effective. For this purpose, the children's
terminals might be programmed to display a picture of the teacher
when their keystrokes were being monitored. Such a visual represen-
tation would provide the electronic equivalent of the teacher's physical
presence that put previous generations of children on notice that they
were being observed. Another novel limitation would be to limit both
the creation of permanent records based on students' daily interactions
with classroom computers and the routine transmission of student
records from instructional to administrative computers.
Formulating specific rules to implement these principles and other-
wise to provide adequate privacy protection promises to be difficult
because of the unique privacy problems presented and the diversity of
the CATI field. Ideally, attention would be paid to several factors:
on behalf of the children whose privacy is invaded. Furthermore, the cost of litigation may be
considered excessive relative to the benefits of a single litigant.
163. Declaratory relief may be available in some situations, but the remoteness of the
conjectured harm will constrict the availability of this avenue. See, ag., FED. R. Civ. P. 57.
164. See generally Sterling, Stressing Design Rather Than Performance Standards to Ensure
Protection ofInformation: Comments, in COMPUTERS AND PRIVACY IN THE NEXT DECADE 103
(L. Hoffman ed. 1980) (emphasizing that rules will not effectively limit information abuse and
recommending that safeguards be built into the technological elements of the system instead of
relying on human compliance with promulgated limitations).
165. See Diem, supra note 3, at 319; cf Sherrer & Roston, Some Legal and Psychological
Concerns About Personality Testing in the Public Schools; 30 FED. B.J. 111, 114 (1971) (children
typically trust school personnel and will do whatever they are asked); Wolfe & Laufer, supra note
73. More specifically-focused research in schools experimenting with computer-assisted
instruction could help to clarify this issue. See generally Caporael & Thorugate, Introduction:
Towards the Social Psychology of Computing, J. Soc. IssuEs, Spring 1984, at 1.
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Purpose of the testing or instruction; context in which it occurs; type
of information recorded and generated; qualifications of the adminis-
trator; characteristics of the subject; use of any resulting records; and
reliability and validity of the process.
To meet the evident need for specificity and technical expertise in
creating an appropriate set of rules, the best approach would be to
enact general legislation and grant authority to one or more adminis-
trative agencies to promulgate regulations and perhaps monitor com-
pliance.1 66 This has been the preferred approach in Canada and a
number of European countries that have established data protection
commissions with authority to particularize and enforce privacy
laws. 167
Although the European model of a comprehensive privacy protec-
tion commission that exercises jurisdiction across domains offers some
advantages,1 68 the same fear of totalitarianism that provides one of the
strongest rationales for protecting privacy also counsels against cen-
tralizing the responsibility for regulation. Moreover, the existence in
the United States of regulatory agencies with authority in related areas
creates an opportunity to build upon established mechanisms rather
than starting afresh.
To extend privacy protection comprehensively, parallel action is
needed at the state level. 169 Federal legislation may serve as a model
for states to build upon in adopting provisions governing CATI in the
private sphere that is beyond federal regulation. In addition, states
should be free to adopt measures that are more protective of individual
privacy.
2. Amending FERPA: A Model Approach
For CATI in education, Congress could amend the Family Educa-
tional Rights and Privacy Act ("FERPA")1 71 to include adequate
166. See Comment, The Use and Abuse of Computerized Information: Striking a Balance
Between Personal Privacy Interests and Organizational Information Needs, 44 ALB. L. REV. 589,
615-18 (1980) (recommending creation of a data protection agency).
167. See Hondius, Data Law in Europe, 16 STAN. J. INT'L L. 87 (1980); Simitis, supra note
57.
168. Spiros Simitis, the data protection commissioner for the West German state of Hesse,
points to total autonomy and insularity from the influence of other agencies with potentially
inconsistent purposes as the chief advantage of the comprehensive independent agency approach.
Simitis, supra note 57, at 742-46.
169. The importance of state legislation is emphasized in Everest, Nonuniform Privacy Laws:
Implications and Attempts at Uniformity, in COMPUTERS AND PRIVACY IN THE NEXT DECADE
141 (L. Hoffman ed. 1980).
170. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1982).
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standards. The FERPA Office within the Department of Education
could be empowered to act as the implementing body.' Modifying
the Act would require only a few simple amendments.
Currently, section (a) of the Act requires the Secretary of Education
to withhold certain federal funds' 72 from institutions that improperly
deny record access to parents or students, and section (b) authorizes
the same withholding of funds if an institution improperly releases stu-
dent information to a third party.'73 Following the format of these
provisions, a new section (c) might read:
No funds shall be made available under any applicable program to
any educational agency or institution which has a policy or practice of
either
(1) using computer-assisted processes to monitor students' per-
formance continuously or without their consent or
(2) creating permanent education records 74 directly from stu-
dents' interactions with a computerized device.
In addition, current section (e), which deals with notifying students
and parents about their rights under the Act, could be amended to
require that the notice include a description of computerized methods
the institution uses to collect information about students and to
explain how students may opt out of computerized monitoring.
These two changes should provide the Department of Education
with a sufficient basis for developing specific regulations that could
keep pace with evolving technologies. In particular, the regulations
would need to elaborate on the meaning in subsection (c)(1) of "con-
tinuously" and the consent requirement. "Continuously" should be
defined as applying to the period during which students are using their
computers, i.e., students should be allowed substantial periods when
monitoring will not occur. The consent provisions should include both
171. For the workplace, the equivalent statute probably would be the Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified as amended in scattered
titles of U.S.C.), with the OSHA Office given the associated administrative responsibilities.
Alternatively or additionally, the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19) could be amended and the National Labor
Relations Board designated as the administrative body.
172. All funds administered by the Department of Education are potentially at stake. See
Privacy Rights of Parents and Students, 34 C.F.R. § 99.1 (1987).
173. For an explanation of FERPA's details, see 1 PRIVACY LAW AND PRACTICE § 6.03 (G.
Trubow ed. 1987).
174. A satisfactory definition of "education records" exists in the regulations, 34 C.F.R.
§ 99.3 (1987) (elaborating 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4) (1982)). A definition of "permanent" would
need to be added. "Permanent education records" here would refer to "records that will remain
in existence beyond the current academic year or which will be used in an automated process to
generate other records that will remain in existence beyond the current academic year."
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an annual request for permission from the parent or student and a
means by which the student in the course of daily affairs can deacti-
vate the monitoring process. In combination with the formal notice
required in section (e), the annual consent requirement will keep the
citizenry informed of the extent of computer monitoring. The "elec-
tronic shield" part of the consent requirement will give students a
measure of control over their privacy.
V. CONCLUSION
If CATI is not regulated, members of future generations who grow
up with incessant computer monitoring may develop a very weak
expectation of privacy against government surveillance. At the
extreme, routinization of computerized privacy invasions may reduce
resistance to a regime that abuses computer-based technologies to con-
trol the population.175 Less cataclysmically, psychological distress
may rise and the sense of individualism that has been a hallmark of the
national character may diminish. As monitoring capabilities increase
and privacy expectations decrease, the eerie vision of Pink Floyd's
lyrics may approach reality.
Welcome my son. Welcome to the machine.
Where have you been? It's all right, we know where you've been.
Welcome my son. Welcome to the machine.
What have you dreamed? It's all right, we told you what to dream.' 76
Certainly such a specter is remote, yet eerily conceivable. Fifteen
years ago Arthur Miller advised that
[a]ny attempt to appraise the implications of the new information tech-
nologies should consider the potential psychological impact on our citi-
zenry of the unchecked computerization and dissemination of personal
data. But virtually nothing is known about the psychology of privacy
and the ways in which contemporary information practices may affect
US. 177
175. The control might come from use of the collected information or from combining the
information with other known data. See Simitis, supra note 57, at 714-18. Computers used in
instruction and testing may someday have on file fairly comprehensive information regarding
individuals' reinforcement preferences. During instruction, the computer would use this
information to provide rewards or inform a teacher of strategies for behavioral management.
One implication of amassing such information is that a repressive regime might use it as a basis
for manipulating individual behavior. The prospect of manipulation of this type is considered in
J. RULE, supra note 6, at 19-31.
176. Pink Floyd, Welcome to the Machine, on WISH You WERE HERE (CBS Records 1975).
Pink Floyd's lyrical prophesy echoes the prosaic accounts of A. HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD
(1932); G. ORWELL, 1984 (1948); and other foretellers of technology's dark side.
177. A. MILLER, supra note 6, at 47.
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Since Miller made this observation, technological capabilities have
expanded exponentially while our understanding of privacy, how
CATI affects it, and the results for human well-being, have increased
only slightly. At a minimum, our ignorance about the costs of privacy
invasion suggests that we should proceed cautiously in adopting new
technologies with tremendous potential for reducing privacy.
Time is growing short. If we are to seize the opportunity to shape
the process rather than accept whatever its proponents deem accepta-
ble, we must act soon. Acting preventively to restrict CATI while
conducting empirical studies to support more informed policy-making
is the best course.
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